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NOTES ON THE RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 




This paper briefly examines the legal and governmental 
issues arising from the recent revelation of Rift Valley Province 
police ngoroko activities, the subsequent warning by the Attorney-
General to such " subversive1' elements , and the constitutionality 
of the recent appointment and functioning of the Attorney-General 
.as acting Minister for Commerce and Industry. These are discussed 
in the context of adherence to the popular politico-legal doctrines 
and practice of the Rule of Lav and Justice and Separation of 
Powers and the shaping of public opinion thereon. 
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Introduction 
It is quite idiomatic at the moment to say that a large section of 
the Kenyan society has become extremely corrupt. The reasons for this 
unwhelesome reality may be numerous, perhaps the most decisive being the 
natural contradictions in the so-called s mixed'- capitalist political economy 
that has failed to respond adequately to the moral, social,, economic, as 
well as political will and needs of Wananchi. 
On the civil plane, this unwholesome situation has given birth to, 
among other things, authoritarian institutions in the form of private as 
well as State supported and/or condoned vigilante groups. Thus ngorokoism 
as a political concept signifying repressive and generally unconstitutional 
political institutions and processes has become part of our vocabulary. It 
is hardly an exaggerations to say that such social order if not checked in 
its infancy can easily deteriorate into proportions akin to Nacism, Fascism., 
or McArthyism in recent European and United States of American social-
political order. If within such a context the Attorney-Generala Mr. Charles 
Njonjot comes out in public - as he has done - to warn the "subversive" elements, 
it is only natural and reasonable for Wananchi and the various categories of 
visitors in Kenya to rally behind him and the new administration, provided, 
or :coursei that some positive action is being taken to reddress the inequities 
so far suffered by the populace. This indeed is the very essence of the now 
popular nyayoist political order. 
In joining the Government and the Attorney-General in applauding 
promises for anticipated reforms, however., it would be patently wrong to 
fail to provide constructive criticism or appraisal of the measures adopted 
to ameliorate the system. Eclectic criticism as such is an invaluable and 
healthy tool for a participatory democratic system especially in a developing 
political economy. In a commendable attitude,, in fact, the Attorney-General 
himself recently invited and encouraged this in his London interview where 
he is reported to have said that if he has taken or takes an unpopular action, 
he is sure he will be criticised.1 It is in this spirit that it becomes 
imperative to evaluate the circumstances in which the Attorney-General-cum-
acting Minister for Commerce and Industry issued the warning to ngorokos and 
the broader fundamental issues of constitutional nature which arise therefrom. 
1. Daily Nation, December 20, 1978, p.l. 
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In this short paper, therefore, an attempt is made to provide: 
a) a brief review of the circumstances which led to the warning 
given by the Attorney-General to ngorokos , 
b) a critical constitutional appraisal of the propriety of a situation 
in which, within the latter and spirit of the Kenyan Constitution, 
an attorney-general while in that capacity also assumes a 
cabinet ministerial portfolio concerned with matters such as 
commerce and industry, and, lastly 
c) an analytical justification for the position that it is not 
in the best interest of .impartial administration of justice for 
an attorney-general, as the chief lawperson, to get involved in 
the mainstream of politics. This latter particularly if it 
goes to the extent that he is moved to threaten some sections 
of the public with the possible use of armed security forces to 
command their obedience to the State and general civic order. 
The. conceptual and theoretical framework that underlie the theses 
developed, in this essay revolve around the doctrines of the. Rule of Law- and 
2 
Justice and the Separation of Powers which, admittedly, are Western developed 
bourgeois politico-legal ideals.upon which the Kenyan Constitution and formal 
governmental structure are predicated. In common to these doctrines is the 
belief that true justice and fidelity to accepted and publicised laws are... 
•best served whenever there is a clear distinction in theory and practice 3 between the judicial, executive, and legislative arms of the government. 
In Kenya, the judiciary, with the attorney-general as its administrative 
head, is the primary judicial organ of the government. It must therefore be 
removed as far as possible from the executive and legislative arms of the 
Government - exepting, of course, legislative drafting - if the achievement 
and maintenance of high moral and legal standards are to be attained, failure 
to maintain such a system both in form and fact may lead to conflicts of 
interest and allegiance both of official and/or personal nature, be they 
intentional or unintentional. 
2. The traditionally accepted concept is that of the Rule "of Law. We 
find this to be a catch-all concept since honest jurists are agreed that law 
is not necessarily justice. To exclude social orders such as that which ob.. ns 
in South Africa in which the 'rule of law' could in its majesty claim to exist, 
we have here adopted a more restrictive term by adding the concept of justice to 
that of law. 
3. See affirmation of this view in the Act of Athens of 18th June, 1955 
and the Declaration of Delhi of 10th January 1959, both being views adopted at 
international fcra..of jurists under the aegis of the International Commission of 
Jurists-?- as for the interpretation of independence- of the judiciary which flows 
from the Separation of Powers, the European Court of Human Rights has stated that 
an independent judiciary is one which is ''independent both of the executive ana 
of the parties to the case:: (emphasis added), Eur. Court H.R., !'Neumeister" Cage 
judgement of 27th June 1968, Series A. Judgements and Decisions, p. 44. 
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2. The Factual Basis of-the -Warning b;?- the Attorney-General to "Subversive 
Elements". 
The available evidence which remain uncontroverted - although not 
yet judicially determined - indicates that a special commando or paramilitary 
unit of the Kenya Police force., while ostensibly entrusted with the task of 
combating cattle rustling (stock theft) in the Rift Valley Provincewas 
actually engaged in vigilante exercises with the full knowledge of the former 
government administration. They were trained to carry out, among other things, 
Political assassinations. The Attorney-General, Mr. Charles Njonjo, who 
revealed this after the change in administration, has in fact alleged that the 
present President, Vice-President and Minister for Finance, and himself were 
5 recently made the targets of this group. 
It may be re-called that the leader of this ngoroko group, Mr. Joseph 
Mungai, a former Assistant Commissioner of Police, was heavily implicated in 
the assassination of J.M. Kariuki. in 1975. J.M. Kariuki was a radical 
bourgeois who broke ranks with his colleagues within the ruling class. 
It is rather ironical that some of those who are new initiating 
and conducting the investigations and hopefully possible prosecution of 
Mr. Mungai and his group were among the leaders in^former administration who 
condoned his activities by omitting to act on the Parliamentary Recommendations 
6 
on the J.M. Kariuki affair- in 1975. In pure theory of law (and politics-!), 
of course, it is quite accepted in international jurisprudence for those who 
may be protected and cloathed with malafide or bonafide legalism by one 
government to become traitors and subversive elements in a new government. 
It is proper, however, to qualify this by observing that the assertion is 
regarded generally as confineable to situations where governmental succession is 7 
achieved through a revolution, or., more in moderntimes, through a military 
putsch. 
4. -See letter from Mungai to the Permanent Secretary in the Office of 
the President, reproduced in the Weekly Review, Mo v.17. 1978, p. 7. 
5. Weekly Review, Supra, pp. 5-6; The Standard, Dec. 18, 1978, p. 1. 
6. See Report of The Select Committee On the Disappearance and Murder 
of the Late Member for Nyandarua North, The HonJ.M. Kariuki, M, P. (1975) 
at Chapter V. 
7. see the classical exposition of this in H. Kelsen General Theory 
of Law and State (Princeton, Princeton. Univ. Press, 1961 Ed. ) at 
see also " - "the appreciation of this in Uganda v. Commissioner of pp. 117-118-
Prisons, Ex. parte Hatovu. (11) (Habeas Corpus) (1966) E.A, 514, at 535-539. 
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As matters stand, at the present-, an extradition request has been 
filed in the Kenya High Court for an order to the Sudanese Government, where 
Mr. Mungai has fled as a fugitive refugee and requested an asylum, to hand 
him over to the Kenyan authorities so that ho can face the "criminal1' charges 
g 
preferred against him/ Whether or not the Sudanese authorities will honour 
the Kenyan request will depend on whether they (the Sudanese) are convinced 
that the actions the Kenyan Government is likely to take to punish Mungai are 
not motivated with political considerations and are purely of non-political 
criminal nature. Both general, customary, and treaty sources of international 
lav; prohibit States from extraditing persons sought for political offences or q 
refugees who are likely to be persecuted by the requesting States. In legal 
jargon, the principles of non-refoulement or non-extradition which also draw 
legitimacy from the general principles of international law of human rights 
dictate against the extradition of political offenders,"^ The Sudanese 
authorities are, of course, not legally bound to provide permanent asylum to 
Mr. Mungai. 
It is the foregoing circumstances, among others that led the Hon. 
Attorney-General-cum-acting Minister for Commerce and Industry, on 30th 
November, 1078 to sound a warning to those indulging in subversive activities. 
He said: 
/ To the "subversive' elements'•'__/ Security forces are watching and 
listening to you........ 
/ And to the President_/ Your Excellency, I am sure you are aware 
that 99.99 per cent of Kenyans ..... are following the Constitution 
and your nyayo (footsteps) 
"You are moving fast and with determination to dig deep and root-
out corruption which has seeped through the very fabric of the Kenyan 
society....... 
'"Allow me to reiterate what I have always maintained, that Kenya 
belongs to all.of-us. We all belong to one Kenya where I am 
pround to say the rule of law will prevail 
8. Weekly Review, supra., p. 5. 
9. A recent scholarly treatment of this is in Grahl-Madsen -, A,. 
Territorial Asylum (Uppsala, Swedish Institute of International Law, 1978) 
pp, 4.2-79. 
10. see generally, United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 
(1967), U.N. G.A. ; Res. 2312 (XXII), particularly Art. 3(1). 
IDS/KP 348 
''It is only in such a climate, where the rule of law reigns 
supreme, that industries such as this one /the Kenya Tobacco 
Processing Plant at Thika_/ can thrive....... 
It is this foregoing message and the circumstances upon which it 
was made which form the center-piece of the following critical analysis of 
some aspects of constitutional development and practice in Kenya as defined 
briefly in section 1,, above. 
3„ Powers of an Attorney-General and the Constitutionality of an Attorney-
General Concurrently Holding a Cabinet Ministerial Office: the critical 
test for the ultra-vires principle. 
The Kenya Constitution provides explicitly that the attorney-
12 
general's office is an office in the public service1''. ' By letter, therefore, 
an attorney-general is a senior civil servant and not a cabinet minister — 
quite contrary to conventional wisdom and, to a considerable extent, practice in 
Kenya. An attorney-general is also the principal legal adviser to the 13 14 government' as well as being the principal public prosecutor. ' Constitutionally, 
therefore, administrative aspects of the judicial administration of law and justice 
i^ ests with the attorney-general. This is an enormous responsibility as it 
is supposed to cover a third of a governmental machinery according to the 
traditional tripartite division of a government into the judiciary,, legislature, 
and executive. 
For purposes of executing the role of principal public prosecutor., 
an attorney-generall is bestowed with certain unlimited powers under Article 
26, subsections (3) and (4) of the Constitution.These include the power to 
institute, undertake or discontinue criminal proceedings, including directing 
the Commissioner of Police to investigate any matters and give a report. 
In invoking these powers, particularly those of discontinuing a criminal 
11• Daily Nation, 1/12/1978 at p. 36. 
12. Constitution of Kenya Act 1969 (Act No. 5 of 1969), Article 26(1). 
13. Ibid., Art. 26(2) 
14. By virtue of duties under Art. 26(3). 
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proceeding (nolle prosequi) and interrupting investigations that may lead 
to an indictment, the margin of appreciation bestowed on an attorney-general 
must be exercised in good faith and in the public interest. An attorney-
general ought not to interfere unduly or pre-empt the judicial process. 
While on this latter point, we may divert alittle and say that the 
proper interpretation of Article 26 of the Constitution does not and ought not 
allow for blanket condoning of large scale (whitecollari? economic crimes. The 
Attorney-General is reported to have said in his London interview, when 
questioned on issues relating to material advantages acquired through corruption, 
that, <!/i_/t will be difficult to get people to repay money. In certain cases 
we shall have to count our losses and look forward. We do not think of seizing 
peoples' assets.'' 1 5 /Emphasis added_7 
Whereas it is true that in some cases - depending on the merits of the 
particular cases - the public may count its losses and look ahead, the assertion 
regarding the policy of non-seizure of property ought not apply to property 
acquired through criminal malfeasance. Neither positive general principles in 
statutes of limitation nor rules of African customary laws forbid or foreclose 
restitution of public property acquired illegally. The institutionalisat.ion 
of inequities have negative influence over the judicial process and one hopes 
that it is not the Kenya Government policy to implement this blanket pardon. 
At least such a policy ought not to come from the Attorney-General. 
It .would be incorrect not to mention here that upon the determination 
of the judicial process a president may, through the exercise of the constitutional 
power of prerogative of mercy, intervene and either pardon a convicted criminal 
or commute a sentence. As such, it is the presidency as the ultimate seat 
of formal justice that ought to decide on whether or not the "whitecollar,; 
criminals who have so far taken the masses for a ride ought to be pardoned. But 
this can be done legally only after the judicial process has taken its impartial 
course and the status of these suspected criminals formally established by lav;. 
It is then that claims of adherence to the Rule of Lav; and Justice may be seen 
to be legitimate. 
15. Daily Nation, December 20, 1978, p.l. 
16. Article 27 of the Constitution. 
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The duties of an attorney-general as a senior civil servant 
is not limited to being the principal legal adviser to the governn nt 
and principal public prosecutor. In addition to these, an attorney-
genoral is a member of the Judicial Service Commission and also head 
of the 'judiciary.17 
In these latter capacities, an attorney-general participates 
in advising the President in the choice of High Court judges, and also 
in the appointment, dismissal and disciplining of magistrates (lower 
court judges), The dispensing of these roles obviously require a very 
high degree of spparation from politics since the impartiality and 
independence of the members of the bench become adulterated ipso facto 
whenever their appointors and supervisors are the active currents in 
the political mainstream. We shall return to this point shortly. For 
now, we shall proceed to analyse the constitutionality of an attorney-
general, while expending the constitutional duties reviewed above, 
also acts as a cabinet minister in charge of commcrce and industry. It 
has already been noted that the attorney-general's speech (quoted above) 
was made in such a capacity. 
Whenever a new president is elected, the Constitution provides 
that the incumbent cabinet is automatically dissolved..13 This is to 
provide the new president an opportunity to chose his/her own team to 
help in running the government. When Hon, arap Moi was declared 
elected on October 10,, and sworn in on October 14, 1978, as the new 
President, the powers he exercised in naming the ministers was therefore 
not those limited to mere r^eshuffling®'' of the cabinet but rather a that.he , 
more primary one. The fact / retained all those who constituted the 
Cabinet during Mzee Kenyatta's reign was partly reflective of Hon. arap 
Hoi's satisfaction with their performance and partly for pragmatic reasons 
of continuity in consideration of the short period left before the next 
general elections, 
18. Ibid. Art. 16. 
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The only post, conventionally regarded as a "cabinet"' post, which did 
not go this natural automatic devolution was that of the Attorney-General. This 
is partly because an attorney-general is a civil servant, as has been outlined. 
The division of duties within the Constitution also indicates that an 
attorney-general does not belong to the ranks of ''ministers" nor is an attorney-
general eligible for performing the functions of a ministry by way of acting. 
Even more fundamental is the incompatibility of the powers and roles of an 
attorney-general with those of a minister. 
Chapter II, Part I of the Constitution describes the functions of 
the office of the President, vice-president, ministers and the cabinet. The 
President has powers to appoint ministers but only "from the members of the 
National Assembly"' elected or nominated. It is to be argued here 
that an attorney-general does not fit into the proper description of an ordinary 
'•member of the National Assembly". It is true that the Attorney-General sits in 
parliament but this is by virtue of his being an attorney-general and not 
because he is either an elected or a nominated member. He is an ex-officio 
19 
member who is not entitled to vote on any question before the National Assembly. 
Should an attorney-general vote in parliament and we ought to 
construe this to include canvassing for votes he would not only be 
acting ultra-vires the Constitution but will be commiting an explicit 
constitutional offence which applies to anyone who votes in the National 20 Assembly without being an elected or nominated member thereof. 
It must be understood from this inability of an attorney-general 
to vote in Parliament that he can not in that capacity share in the collective 
. . . . 21 responsibility which other members of the cabinet have to the national assembly. 
.not 
The Attorney-General does not only/share in the forgoing essential 
functions of ordinary members of the National Assembly, he is also not liable to 
vacate his ex-officio seat in the Assembly for committing varies constitutional 2 9 
offences to which the ordinary members of the Assembly are subject. *" In other 
words, he has a special and privileged position in the Assembly while having 
limited roles therein. 
19. Ibid. Arts. 31 and 36 
20. Ibid., Art. 55 
21. Ibid. Art. 17 
22. Ibid. Art. 39 
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We have already seen that the President has Constitutional powers of 
appointing ministers from among elected or nominated members of the National 
Assembly. The President has also powers to assign any duties to a minister, 
including those of acting for other ministers whenever they are not able to 
23 
perform their roles. As a civil servant who is neither an ordinary nominated 
nor an elected member of the National Assembly and who also has overall 
responsibility over the judiciary, an attorney-general is Constitutionally 
ineligible for appointment as a minister or an acting minister. The recent 
appointment and functioning of the Hon. Attorney-General as acting Minister 
for Commerce and Industry was therefore unconstitutional. In addition it has 
had a more significant theoretical implication of obliterating the division or 
separation of powers of the Government into the judiciary, the legislature, 
and the executive. And since the Rule of Law and Justice hinges on the clear 
separation of powers both in theory and practice, it must be concluded that 
it, too, has suffered in this recent development. 
Further it should be noted here that once one is appointed to be 
in charge of a ministry, the appointee is Constitutionally bound to "exercise 
24 
general direction and control over that department". A ministerial post is not 
a sinecure position as it entails both legislative and administrative duties. 
From this it can be seen that an attorney-general who is Constitutionally 
limited in his/her legislative activities in the National Assembly is functionally 
not able to carry out the full duties of a minister without contravening the 
Constitution. 
We now turn and look briefly at what the public opinion may be on 
the role of the Attorney-General in Kenya's Governmental administration. We 
hasten to point out however that a scientifically acceptable comprehensive survey 
of public opinion is outside the scope and purpose of this paper. It suffices 
here to look at the recent review in the Weekly Review which focused on the 
politics of transition from the Kenyatta to the Moi administrations. 
In assessing the role of certain powerful persons who helped steer 
25 
the country into the very commendable smooth transition, the Weekly Review 
had this to say of the Hon. Attorney-General: 
23. • Ibid. Art. 18 
24. Ibid. Art. 22(x). 
25. Weekly Review., Oct. 13, 1978, p.7. 
t 
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Njonjo has been a major centre of power for the past 
decade and more of Kenya's history. In a country where there is a great 
deal of laxity in many matters of public life, the chief lav?man 
often becomes a very powerful person by virtue of the many secrets he 
gets to know about men in positions of leadership. Used shrewdly, 
this knowledge provides its possessor with a lot of political muscle, 
and those who know Njonjo say that over the past few months, he has 
quietly used his immense power to steer the constitutional processes 
of the country in the direction of smooth transition. Njonjo it 
was who two years ago, frustrated the anti-Moi move which emanated 
from a number of leaders, including cabinet ministers, in an attempt 
to change the Kenya constitution to bar the vice president from 
succeeding the president. Njonjo has of late been acting as the chief 
interpreter of the Kenya constitution and his views have prevailed 
in a number of issues where politicians have tended to show 
division. Njonjo's commitment to Moi goes back longer than Kibaki's 
or any other cabinet member's. For this commitment to Moi, Njonjo was 
for a long time hated by many Kikuyu leaders, especially those 
from the Kiairibu area, who considered him as some kind of traitor. 
Njonjo is not an elected MP and clearly has no wish to get 
involved in popular politics. But then he does not need to. 
Anyone who has watched his role in the process of transition in 
Kenya during the past month and a half could not help but be 
struck by the central position which he has occupied in the country's 
political scheme of things, a position which is unlikely_to be 
diminished by the rise of anyone else in the cabinet. /_ all 
emphases added_/ 
The foregoing passages point at the various conclusions the ordinary 
observers have of the roles the Attorney-General has so far been seen to 
perform in the country. It can easily be seen from this and the analysis in 
the early parts of this paper that the Attorney-General has gone deep into 
the political mainstream, a fact which easily explains why he may have been 
tempted to make the ' threat1' which we have interpreted to. be coloured more with 
political than juridical overtones. 
Apart from providing an indicator of what interpretations some important 
institutions have of the overall role of the Attorney-General in Kenyan politics, 
the reference in the Weekly Review to the fact that the Attorney-General has 
acted as the chief interpreter of the Kenyan Constitution needs some clarification. 
Whereas it is true an attorney-general as a person may become a legal 
publicist of outstanding repute who is respected by many and whose interpretation 
of the Constitution may be persuasive, it is highly unconstitutional and improper 
for an attorney-general to act and be seen as the ultimate legitimate inter-
preter of the Constitution. As chief legal adviser to the government, the 
government should and is, of course, bound to accept an attorney-general's 
opinion of the law. But such interpretations of the law, including the 
Constitution, as may be given by an attorney-general have no legal standing and 
are not binding an everyone. 
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The Constitution although not explicit in general terms makes it 
quite clear that the High Court is the chief and only authoritative interpreter 
26 
of the constitution and other substantial questions of lav?..' Binding interpreta-
tion of the Constitution is a judicial act and not an administrative undertaking 
falling within the office of the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General is 
head of the judiciary but his powers are constitutionally limited to administrative 
matters. It is the courts of lav/ that must independently decide on questions of 
law in order that the independence of the judiciary may become a practical 
reality. 
We shall conclude this paper by briefly examining the implications of 
the foregoing governmental and constitutional developments for the impartial admi-
nistration of law and justice in Kenya. 
4. Some Concluding Remarks. 
The foregoing analysis has, hopefully, shown that an attorney-general 
is and should be first and foremost a law person and not a barrel-of-a-gun 
person or a person of muscle. This is not to deny that the government as a whole 
is not an organization with coercive attributes. That the incumbent attorney-
general found it fit to warm potential lawbreakers with the possible use of armed 
security forces as a medium of punishment is, to use an understatement, unfortunately 
inappropriate and not keeping in line with the Constitution. Coming from the 
Attorney-General, such expressed state of mind may and does engender in the 
public a negative image of the government and generally impair possible adherence 
to the rule of lav/ and justice as ideals of the society. 
From the juridical standpoint it is clear that the Constitution, 
which jurisprudentially ought to be expressing the basic norms of this society, 
can not be interpreted to allow an attorney-general to assume other executive duties 
of State which may lead to either intentional or unintentional conflicts of 
interests within the structure of separation of powers. Should the constitution 
as it stands to-day permit interpretations which leads to flouting of the basic 
principle of separation of powers, then an amendment would be highly recommended 
to disallow such interpretation. The independence of the judiciary which is at 
the very core of the principles of Rule of Law and Justice and Separation of Powers 
require this so as to avoid conditions conducive to the abuse of power. 
Reading the foregoing analysis, progressive socialist minds will 
be quick to point out that this is no more than liberal democratic idealism since 
the constitution being an expression of power relations within the political econo-
my can only reflect the low level of responsiveness to socio-economic and political 
26. Article 67 of the Constitution. 
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needs of the people as the economy has so far done. Such conceptualisation 
may. be correct. This essay is however not concerned with the more fundamental 
question as to the social legitimacy of the Constitution and the economic base 
from which it is derived and which it protects and promotes. We are here limited 
to the issue of governmental fidelity to agreed to laws and principles which 
underlie the political system and ideology it has declared to follow. 
The capitalist liberal democratic world in the metropolis has 
provided examples where the executive has found it tempting, quite in contradiction 
to the publicised political philosophy, to embrace the judicial branches of 
their governments so as to make braking of the rules of the game easier. 
President Kennedy made his brother the attorney-general of the United States 
of North America. Nixon J?ed2eci himself with confidant lawmen which led the 
United States of North America to flinch in the face of Watergate Scandal. 
Kenya can easily avoid setting herself a trap that may lead to 
serious injuries in terms of breakdown in law and justice and possible supremacy 
of the rule by ''security1' forces. An essential ingredient in making law 
supreme is to keep the head of the judiciary as far removed from the mainstream 
of politics as possible and with practical commitment to the Constitution. 
